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I
INTRODUCTION
The death penalty has its fervent defenders and critics.  In all the debate
about the procedure, however, no one has suggested how a feminist perspective
might improve the discussion.  Feminist theory can be helpful in several ways.
First, we can learn from the lives of the women embroiled in the process.  In-
deed, fifty-four women currently live on death row.1  Not only are women them-
selves imprisoned by the state, but women are also the mothers, sisters, and
wives of those condemned to die.  Countless numbers of women are the victims
of the crimes for which men are sentenced to death.  And women are, in still
small but growing numbers, the judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys em-
broiled in the process.  Second, and more importantly, the decision to impose
the death penalty and the procedures for doing so present traditionally male
ways of looking at the problem, presenting judges and juries with a limited
means of considering the issues: Universal standards are divorced from context,
dichotomous choices are imposed in place of a range of alternatives, and emo-
tions are excised from the procedure.  Imposing a feminist lens on the proce-
dure will round out the largely one-sided argument.
For these reasons and others, it is appropriate to look at the death penalty
from a feminist perspective.  How has the system affected the lives of women?
How does the process and the punishment reflect the voices of women?  Why
are so few women sentenced with this penalty, and what does this imply about
our culture?  What is the feminist response to a procedure that ostensibly rids
this country of the people who threaten women in the most violent ways?
In Autumn 1998, Law and Contemporary Problems published an issue ex-
ploring the American Bar Association’s Proposed Moratorium on the Death
Penalty.2  This note advances another argument in favor of the proposed mora-
torium—that, by employing feminist methodology to examine the death pen-
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1. Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/womenstats.html (last up-
dated July 1, 2001).  This number represents only two percent of the more than 3,600 men currently
living on death row.
2. See Symposium, The ABA’s Proposed Moratorium on the Death Penalty, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (Autumn 1998).
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alty, it becomes clear that the current procedural system fails to represent large
numbers of those penalized under the system. Accordingly, the major purpose
of this note is to start a conversation about the ways in which thinking from a
feminist perspective may help us, as a society, to approach the death penalty in
a more productive and holistic fashion.  This note points out that, even when
there is a horrible crime, and instinct calls for death, there are contextual factors
that must be considered.  Universal standards that require “yes” or “no” an-
swers fail to address the needs of both the victims of crime and its perpetrators.
Until criminal procedure is reconfigured to better represent those voices, it is
inappropriate for the democratic state to impose such a final and severe sen-
tence.
After a brief exploration of the need for a feminist perspective on capital
punishment in Part II, Part III begins by determining which feminist methodol-
ogy is most appropriate to an analysis of the death penalty.  The strengths and
weaknesses of two of the many models of feminist thought are specifically out-
lined.  I do not attempt to defend the wisdom of one school of thought over the
other; rather, my goal is to fuse the two theories to create a different way of
looking at the capital punishment system.  Part IV applies this hybrid method-
ology to the leading Supreme Court cases on the death penalty and asks
whether we should have the death penalty at all.  The note then considers, if we
are to have the death penalty, how we might make the procedure more fair.
Part V questions the procedures used to employ capital punishment and finds
discrepancies in how the law handles cases involving crimes committed in the
public and private sphere.  Part VI considers victim impact statements as an ex-
ample of an attempt to universalize the criminal justice system, and considers
how the initiative has fallen short.  The note concludes by suggesting that, while
there is no immediate resolution to the problem, rethinking capital punishment
from a feminist perspective will start a more productive discussion of the issue.
II
WHY WE NEED A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE DEATH PENALTY
Since the earliest of times, and certainly within the history of the United
States, the voices of women have been absent from the criminal justice system.
White men of property wrote the Constitution.  The laws of the federal gov-
ernment and of the states overwhelmingly have been drafted and executed by
men.  Even today, only thirteen women are United States Senators, and sixty-
one women are members of the House of Representatives—far from propor-
tionate to the number of women in this country.3  Similarly, women have yet to
receive equal representation on the bench where the law is interpreted.4
3. See http://www.4woman.gov/nwhic/current/107th%20congress.htm; see also http://www.gender
gap.com/government/governor.htm (noting that record high was set in January 2001, when ten percent
of all U.S. governors were women).
4. See http://www.gendergap.com/governme.htm (last modified June 6, 2001) (“One hundred and
thirteen individuals have been appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court . . . two are women.  Excluding the
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Despite the scarcity of women’s voices in the creation of the criminal justice
system, women are hardly missing from the equation.  Omnipresent throughout
criminal legislation is the notion that laws can be used, through the know-how
of men, to protect and preserve the sanctity of “womanhood.”  The central
premise to this phenomenon, that the law is the protector of feminine virtue, le-
gitimizes male dominance over women and was reinforced through ecclesiasti-
cal and legal traditions in the times even before our own laws were written.5
Even Aristotle, the “giant of Western thought,”6 writing in the third century
B.C., argued that it was the different natures of men and women that accounted
for their disparate roles in society.7  In Aristotle’s own words, “nature,” not cul-
ture, men, or social forces, “has made the one sex stronger, the other weaker,
that the latter through fear may be more cautious, while the former by its cour-
age is better able to ward off attacks; and that the one may acquire possessions
outside the house, the other preserve within.”8
Through the years, this social order, originally founded on disparities in
physical strength, emerged as worthy of preservation through the law.9  Laws
sanctioned male pursuit of positions of public power, while largely ignoring
women who, until quite recently, were confined to maintaining the home.  Ac-
cordingly, the law developed by regulating interactions in the public sphere,
leaving the home to private regulation.10  For this reason, until the mid-
nineteenth century, there was little sympathy for granting women the right to
Supreme Court there are 1,612 Federal judges, 332 (20.6%) are women, up from 154 (9.5%) in 1997. . . .
Between 1980 and 1991, the percentage of women state judges increased from 4% to 9%.).
5. See, e.g., Ephesians 5:22-24 (exhorting wives to submit to their husbands, as the husband is the
head of the wife).
6. Renford Bambrough, Introduction to THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE 11 (J.L. Creed & A.E.
Wardman trans., Mentor Books 1963).  Bambrough notes that “the importance of Aristotle in the in-
tellectual history of Europe is too well known to need explanation or defense.”  Id.
7. As John Stuart Mill recognized, “no less an intellect, and one which contributed no less to the
progress of human thought, than Aristotle, held this opinion without doubt or misgiving” and justified
his opinion on the premise that there are “different natures among mankind, free natures, and slave
natures.”  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 129 (Stefan Collini ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1989) (1869).
8. 2 ARISTOTLE, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2131 (Jonathan Barnes ed., rev. Oxford
ed. 1984)
9. See generally MILL, supra note 7.  Mill noted that:
The adoption of this system of inequality never was the result of deliberation, or forethought,
or any social ideas, or any notion whatever of what conduced to the benefit of humanity or the
good order of society.  It arose simply from the fact that from the very earliest twilight of hu-
man society, every woman (owing to the value attached to her by men, combined with her in-
feriority in muscular strength) was found in a state of bondage to some man.  Laws and sys-
tems of polity always begin by recognising the relations they find already existing between
individuals.  They convert what was a mere physical fact into a legal right, give it the sanction
of society, and principally aim at the substitution of public and organised means of asserting
and protecting these rights, instead of the irregular and lawless conflict of physical strength.
Those who had already been compelled to obedience became in this manner legally bound to
it.
Id. at 123.
10. See generally Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Subordination and the Role of
the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151-57 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed.
1990).
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vote or for married women to control their own property or to make their own
contracts.11  Although feminist theory already has exposed bias in many facets of
contemporary life and the world has changed significantly since the mid-1800s,
vestiges of male thinking remain in the legal system, particularly in the criminal
law.  For example, to this day, criminal penalties are much more severe for
stranger violence than for domestic violence, or for stranger rape than for mari-
tal rape.12  The law continues to differentiate between protecting women inside
the home and outside the home.
The result of this different treatment severely limits the participation of
many citizens in our democratic government.  First, women, when treated as
objects in need of protection, are discouraged from further engaging in public
discourse.  The result is to perpetuate traditionally male ways of thinking that
offer only limited views of the world, boiling choices down to black and white
and imposing universalisms where context is more appropriate.  Feminist theory
allows us to pay more attention to bias and power disparity.  By extension, we
can then recognize other biases permeating our system, including racism and
classism.  As Katharine Bartlett notes, being feminist means owning up to the
part one plays in a sexist society and taking responsibility for the existence and
transformation of “our gendered identity, our politics, and our choices.”13  It is
through united opposition to the procedures that disempower these marginal-
ized groups that the system can be changed to become more representative.
III
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL LAW
The discussion to come about what feminist theory has to offer to the capital
punishment debate is informed by looking at two well-known feminist theories:
different voice theory and dominance theory. 14  Although at first glance these
two theories appear to be at odds, they both offer insight into how universal and
so-called “neutral” standards hide unequal power relationships.  Likewise, both
theories shed light on the decision to reinstate the death penalty in the United
States, on the procedural defects present in current capital punishment law, and
on ways to modify the system.
A. Different Voice Theory
Within different voice theory, “women’s differences are viewed . . . as a po-
tentially valuable resource that might serve as a better model of social organiza-
11. See id.
12. See infra Part V.
13. Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 833 (1990).
14. See generally KATHARINE BARTLETT & ANGELA HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY,
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 487-791 (2d ed. 1998).  Feminism is a rich concept that has been defined in
relation to countless other disciplines, perspectives, and objectives.  These two “subcategories” offer
only two of many potential perspectives on capital punishment.
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tion and law than existing ‘male’ characteristics and values.”15  The model is
premised on the notion that current law and legal theory have been based on an
exclusively male model of the world16 that characterizes “male” and “female”
thought along one fairly clear line: “Women are actually or potentially materi-
ally connected to other human life.  Men aren’t.”17  The result, according to psy-
chologist Carol Gilligan, the mother of the different-voice model, is a creation
of two different ways to conceptualize the rights of citizens: the “ethic of jus-
tice” and the “ethic of care.”18
Different-voice feminism defines itself in opposition to the traditionally
male “ethic of justice,” which embodies the dominant rationality and method-
ology of American law.19  This tradition finds its roots in philosophies like those
of Immanuel Kant in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.  There,
Kant equates the highest and unconditional good with acts arising not out of
kindness, but out of duty.20  The genuinely moral person is one who, though
“cold in temperament and indifferent to the suffering of others. . . does good,
not from inclination, but from duty.”21 As aptly voiced by the American jurist
Oliver Wendell Holmes, “[t]he justice-oriented problem-solver seeks a dis-
tanced stance from which to make objective decisions by applying formal rules
of equality and other principles of justice.”22  Justice Holmes went on to remark
that, when lawyers in his courtroom made appeals to justice, he stopped listen-
ing: “[S]uch appeals do nothing but signal that the lawyer has neither the facts
nor law on his side, or worse, that he is ignorant of whatever law might be rele-
vant.”23  Recently, Justice Anthony Scalia reiterated his respect for this method
of resolving disputes.  In his dissent from the Court’s recent decision in PGA
Tour, Inc. v. Martin, he argued that the majority opinion “exercises a benevo-
lent compassion that the law does not place it within our power to impose.”24
When pressed to explain his use of the phrase “benevolent compassion,” Justice
Scalia noted that he was stressing the “social-outreach, maternalistic, goo-goo
characteristic of the court’s compassion.”25
15. Id. at 705.
16. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1988) (“[A]ll of our mod-
ern legal theory . . . is essentially and irretrievably masculine.”)
17. Id. at 14.
18. Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an
Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1990).
19. Id. at 36 (noting that “[t]raditionally, this perspective was deemed the highest stage of moral
development, and it has monopolized legal reasoning”).
20. See Robin West, Justice and Care, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31, 36-37 (1996) (citing LEE DIMOCK,
RESIDUES OF JUSTICE (1996)).
21. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 66 (H.J. Patton trans.,
Harper & Row 1958) (“[I]t is precisely in this that the worth of character begins to show—a moral
worth and beyond all comparison the highest.”).
22. Bender, supra note 18, at 37.
23. Robin West, Toward Humanistic Theories of Legal Justice, 10 CARDOZO STUD. L. &
LITERATURE 147, 147 (1998); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED
PAPERS 201 (Harry C. Shriver ed., 1936)
24. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1898 (2001).
25. William Safire, On Language: Compassion, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
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Different-voice theorists criticize the ethic of justice for its disjunction with
individual people and circumstances.  For example, in the context of capital
punishment, the model uses judge-made law and statutes to weigh the compet-
ing rights that are in dispute.  Individual circumstances are stripped out of the
equation, and each crime is boiled down to its bare criminal elements.  If there
are no constitutionally-prescribed exceptions to capital punishment, we appro-
priately apply the death penalty.  If a defendant’s particular circumstances do
not fall within this carefully delineated model, we must bend it to fit the model.
In applying these cold and reasoned calculations that are devoid of any hu-
man element, legal thinking embraces the “ethic of justice.”  Different-voice
feminists argue that this so-called Rule of Law and the notions of rationality
and objectivity are really codes for a conception of social order based on patri-
archal beliefs.26  These beliefs are perpetuated by those who teach and interpret
the laws: The result is that, even though women have become part of the disci-
pline of law, they relearn the world through the eyes of men, discounting tradi-
tional “female” characteristics such as emotion and empathy.27
An illustration of the male-produced Rule of Law at its most infant stage
emerges in Lani Guinier’s study on women in law school.28  Guinier found that
many female law students felt that “learning to think like a lawyer means
learning to think and act like a man.  As one male professor told a first-year
class, ‘To be a good lawyer, behave like a gentleman.’”29  In law school, and by
extension in the legal world, behaving “like a gentleman” means adopting a
standardized, hierarchical, competitive approach that evolves into a game that
opponents play to win: “You win when you silence your opponent.”30  In this
fight to prevail, the task is not to listen and respond to the perspectives of oth-
ers, but to divorce emotion from circumstance and to manipulate individual
lives into black letter law.31
In reaction to the influence of the “ethic of justice,” different-voice feminists
argue that a second model exists for conceptualizing relationships.  They have
coined this model the aforementioned “ethic of care”—premised on a more
traditionally female means of understanding problems.32  Rather than employ-
ing an objective stance with formal rules, the care model focuses attention on
26. West, supra note 20, at 36-38. It is important to articulate that this method of feminist reason-
ing is not the polar opposite of a “male” deductive model of legal reasoning.  See Bartlett, supra note
11, at 855-56.  It would not be accurate to divide both models into a stark black-and-white contrast be-
tween generalization and individualism.  Both models put facts into some sort of context and use that
context to draw conclusions about a case.  The difference is that the ethic-of-care model considers a
broader context than is traditionally considered in current legal procedure.  The method seeks to un-
cover perspectives that have traditionally been ignored or discarded by the fact-finder in resolving a
conflict.  See id.
27. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN (1997).
28. See id.
29. Id. at 29.
30. Id. at 13.
31. Id. at 13-14.
32. Bender, supra note 18, at 36-37.
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the context of the dispute and the parties’ ongoing relationships and interde-
pendencies.33  The care model problem-solver looks beyond the immediate facts
and asks questions that are not usually present in the typical legal setting.34  She
must consider the articulated needs of all parties in the dispute and balance the
merits of various solutions as opposed to relying on abstract rights and universal
rules.35  By legitimizing the role of empathy and context in the criminal justice
system, the model would allow the consideration of factors not typically heard
in the legal process.  Robin West perhaps best illustrates the ethic of care model
through imagery of
a mother’s protective and nurturing embrace of her newborn.  Her posture is not up-
right, but curved.  To nurture and protect her child, she makes herself into an “O” . . .
a mother provides care, protection, warmth, comfort, and love to her newborn, not
through the independent linearity of a morally upright pillar of strength, but through
the interwoven, interdependent strength of the circle of care.36
Ultimately, the goal is to formulate a criminal justice system that fits the indi-
vidual defendant and that addresses the needs of the victim and the community,
as opposed to finding a way to fit the individual into the appropriate model.
The different-voice model, or “difference model,” falls short in some signifi-
cant respects.  The first is the concern, voiced by many feminists, that attribut-
ing the care model to women will reinforce sex-linked stereotypes and limit
women to the role of care-givers and nurturers.37  Some feminists argue that
celebrating these characteristics as female is in fact solidifying a system that im-
poses these characteristics on women and masks their true identity.38  The risk is
that the role of women will be further discounted in the “rational” world domi-
nated by men and that the model implies that women are biologically incapable
of applying legal reasoning.
Additionally, this paradigm encounters some difficulty when we try to pin-
point whose voice should be amplified.  The model ideally seeks a compromise
between competing voices—a solution that fits into the context in which the
crime was committed and in which both the victim and the offender stand.  The
outstanding question is whether a satisfactory conclusion can be reached that
can address both points of view.  There may be some circumstances where the
parties stand at such opposite ends from one another that providing a solution
that takes into account one viewpoint may necessarily disadvantage the other.
The different-voice model does not instruct us on how to resolve such a conflict.
33. Robin West argues that “we are in the process of covering not only our country but increas-
ingly the world with a conception of adjudicative law pointed only to the interconnected virtues of cor-
porate wealth, individual decisional liberty, and, when not trumped by the universalist mandate of
wealth, of moral and cultural relativism.”  West, supra note 23, at 149.
34. Bender, supra note 18, at 36-37.
35. Id. at 37.
36. West, supra note 20, at 36.
37. Bender, supra note 18, at 39-42.
38. See, e.g., the philosophies of Catherine MacKinnon, discussed infra p. 266-69.
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Instead, this model focuses on individual dilemmas and conflicts that are over-
looked in more abstract legal reasoning.39
Despite these shortcomings, there is evidence that the current legal system is
premised on a view of the world that largely rejects these characteristics alto-
gether.  Incorporating these values into legal procedure and dispute resolution,
particularly in the context of capital cases, could lead to more universalistic and
fair results.  As Bender notes, “[c]aring and cooperation are quintessential val-
ues and should be promoted and nurtured in our society, even if historically
their work has been unduly, unfairly, and disproportionately foisted upon
women.”40  By revaluing these traits in our legal system, they can be promoted
and maintained through the Rule of Law just as rationality and generalized uni-
versalism have been.
B. Dominance Theory
In a discussion of the death penalty, dominance theory, epitomized by the
writings of Catharine MacKinnon, adds to difference theory the idea that male
privilege is so embedded in our society in general and the legal system in par-
ticular that it cannot be distinguished from, and indeed is, the Rule of Law.41
MacKinnon criticizes difference theory because of her belief that emphasizing
difference reinforces the subordination of women and locks women into a di-
chotomy originally created and perpetuated by men.42  The difference model ul-
timately legitimizes the civil inequality of the sexes and leads to acceptance of
biological difference as a means of upholding the system.43  Women reinforce
the paradigm when they seek recognition of their differences because they must
present themselves as in need of “protection” by the dominant power.44
Dominance theorists are particularly critical of “gender neutral” or so-called
objective approaches to the law as codes for embracing male conceptions of
objectivity and neutrality.45  “Equality,” according to this standard, affirms spe-
39. Bartlett, supra note 13, at 850.
40. Bender, supra note 18, at 42.
41. See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW (1987); see also BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 14, at 487-702 (refering to the same concept as
the “nonsubordination” perspective on women and law).
42. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 32-45.  MacKinnon notes that
women value care because men have valued us according to the care we give them, and we
could probably use some.  Women think in relational terms because our existence is defined in
relation to men . . . .  All I am saying is that the damage of sexism is real, and reifying that into
differences is an insult to our possibilities.
Id. at 39.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 38-39 (discussing Carol Gilligan’s view on gender differences).
45. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1207-09 (1989) (discussing how, despite the quest of women to be
treated the same as men, sexual harassment in the workplace acts as a reminder to women that the
sexes remain radically unequal, and a woman is often viewed as an object of sexual derision rather than
as a credible coworker).  MacKinnon argues that the question of women in the military draft provides
another example of the sameness answer to the sex equality question.  See MACKINNON, supra note 41,
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cific white male cultural values as the appropriate standard.46  Consequently, for
women to gain access to the privileges traditionally afforded men, they must
submissively adopt “male” principles as their own.47  Requiring that women
emulate male thinking glosses over the different experiences of women and in-
sufficiently addresses the root of discrimination. 48
Dominance feminists criticize current sex discrimination law as a combina-
tion of gender-neutral and difference standards that simply do not go far
enough in addressing the pervasive gender inequities in our system.  While very
few women succeed at achieving access to privileges traditionally afforded men,
women continue to lose their “traditional” rights to men who assert claims un-
der the gender-neutral standard.49  One salient example surfaces in the law of
rape.  If women emulate traditional male notions of vengeance and retribution,
they should seek recompense for violations committed against them.50  Under a
gender-neutral standard, women should demand respect for violation of their
bodies by imposing the harshest punishment available—a penalty less than
death would devalue women.
Using a dominance analysis, focusing first on the question whether death is
the feminist response to rape is misleading.  Meting out equal punishment for
equally destructive acts only reinforces the notion that the traditional views on
punishment should be universal views.  This perspective dims the nuances of
how rape uniquely impacts a woman’s sense of being.  For these reasons, recent
initiatives to reform rape law have been directed toward making the system
more sensitive and more responsive, yet have done little to address the question
of why women are raped in the first place.51  MacKinnon argues that such
changes only make the law more progressive, and do little to make it more
feminist.52  If we attempt to apply so-called neutral standards, then we will ob-
scure the characteristics of rape that mark its role in the power dynamics be-
tween men and women and further legitimize male control over women’s sexu-
ality.
Considering this concept in the context of who is implicated in many rape
cases further illustrates this point.  MacKinnon writes, “[t]o the extent posses-
sion is the point of sex, rape is sex with a woman who is not yours, unless the act
at 32-34 (“[G]ender neutrality is thus simply the male standard, and the special protection rule is simply
the female standard, but do not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is the referent for both.”).
46. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 34.
47. Id. at 37-38.  To extend Kathryn Abrams’ argument regarding gender discrimination in the
workplace would mean that women must act like men to earn the respect of male coworkers.  See
GUINIER, supra note 27.
48. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 39-40.
49. Id. at 35-37.
50. MARC TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: THE DEATH PENALTY 3-5 (1994) (discussing the
role of deterrence and retribution in thinking about the death penalty).
51. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurispru-
dence, 8 SIGNS 635, 642-45 (1983).
52. Id.
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is so as to make her yours.”53  Statistically, most rapes are by a man the woman
knows.54  Most rapes are intra-racial, rather than interracial; rapes in which
black men are the perpetrators and white women are the victims account for the
smallest number of reported rapes.55  Yet, statistics continue to show that Afri-
can-American men convicted of raping and murdering white women are signifi-
cantly more likely to be sentenced to death than men who rape and murder Af-
rican-American women.56  MacKinnon explains this phenomenon by arguing
that these crimes “have two qualities: they are by a stranger, and they are by a
black man.  These two elements give you the white male archetype of rape.”57
These images simultaneously invoke the patriarchal notion of women as prop-
erty of white men in need of protection on the one hand, and play into the racist
stereotype of black men as defilers of white womanhood on the other.58
MacKinnon’s philosophy on the subjugation of women through male-
focused law translates into philosophies exposing the subjugation of the poor
and people of color.  Her analysis of rape and race exposes the way in which the
existing social order subjugates black men as well as women.  While MacKinnon
limits her analysis to women, it quickly becomes clear that the experiences of all
“others” (that is, those other than white men) have been silenced out of the le-
gal system, because those creating the system do not feel these experiences.
Simply adapting the existing standard to people who traditionally have been
marginalized by this system will not sufficiently address its inherent problems.
Using existing legal tools created and conceptualized by men of power will
never succeed in undermining or truly equalizing that system.
Accordingly, MacKinnon advances a new standard by which sex discrimina-
tion should be viewed, a standard she labels “radical feminism” or the “domi-
nance approach.”59  Radical feminism defines sex equality by addressing the
power dynamics of submission and dominance that characterize the sexes.  It is
a standard that “criticizes all the ways [women] have been created by being ex-
cluded and kept down but that also claims the validity of [women’s] experi-
53. Id. at 645.
54. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 81 (citing DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION:
RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT, 90-93 (1984)).
55. Elizabeth Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses of
Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 868, 881 (1996) (citing GARY D.
LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (1989)).
56. Phyllis L. Crocker, Is the Death Penalty Good for Women?, 4 BUFF. L. REV. 917, 928-43 (2001);
see also TUSHNET, supra note 50, at 36.  Tushnet cites the Inc. Fund study that found in the mid-1960s
that African-American men convicted of rape were times more likely to be sentenced to death than
white men, and that African-American men convicted of raping white women were eighteen times
more likely to be sentenced to death than any other combination. This evidence was presented before
the Supreme Court in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).  For a discussion of the Maxwell litiga-
tion, see MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 86-105, 149-67, 199-213 (1973).  It is important to note that rape alone no longer serves as
a justification for capital punishment.
57. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 81.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 40-45.
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ence[s].”60  MacKinnon argues that “gender is an inequality first, constructed as
a socially relevant differentiation in order to keep that inequality in place[;] the
sex inequality questions are questions of systematic dominance, of male su-
premacy, which is not at all abstract and is anything but a mistake.”61  To recon-
ceptualize the system outside of male dominance requires a radical shift away
from the male construction of female freedom.
Although dominance theory exposes the gender and power inequities in our
system, it imposes nearly impossible hurdles to overcoming the inequality in so-
ciety.  If all people, including women, have been socialized by the system to ac-
cept its underlying gender biases, how can we escape the patriarchy or even
contemplate these changes?  Who is untainted enough by the current system to
be qualified to implement these changes?62  And how do we avoid substituting
one power structure for another, specifically a power structure that is “woman”
but otherwise white, middle class, and heterosexual?63  Dominance theory offers
no real answer to these questions, but it provides a means to question the un-
derlying system and to expose its failings.
C. Developing a Method to Critique the Death Penalty
Both different voice feminist theory and dominance theory offer something
to the debate on the death penalty.  Central to both theories is the tenet that the
current system is one that is male, propertied, and white, largely excluding the
voices of those it processes through its courts and prisons.  Regardless whether
dominance or different voice theory is adopted, considering legal issues from a
feminist perspective “means looking beneath the surface of law to identify the
gender implications of rules and the assumptions underlying them and insisting
upon applications of rules that do not perpetuate woman’s subordination.”64  It
demands “special attention to a set of interests and concerns that otherwise
might be, and historically have been, overlooked.”65  Finally, feminist analyses
of legal decisionmaking have revealed that the so-called neutral means of de-
ciding cases tend to mask, not eliminate, political and social considerations from
legal decisionmaking.  These “neutral” or “objective” means are not truly neu-
tral, but are instead driven by a different set of emotional variables that are so
ancient, that they have become invisible.
60. Id. at 120.
61. Id. at 42.
62. See MacKinnon, supra note 51, at 642-45 (arguing that women suffer from a false consciousness
approach that is evidence of their stake in their own oppression).
63. See BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 14, at 1007-09; see also Angela Harris, Race and Essen-
tialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
64. Bartlett, supra note 13, at 843.
65. Id. at 846.
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IV
APPLYING FEMINIST REASONING TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM
If we apply the feminist methodology defined above to the death penalty as
it exists in the United States today, we must conclude that the current system,
like most criminal justice policy, follows the same patterns in which the perspec-
tive of women is absent—except as the protected beneficiary of the law.  This
section of this note will address the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s decision, af-
ter a brief hiatus, to hold that the death penalty is a constitutional form of pun-
ishment.
In colonial times, statutes authorized capital punishment for a host of crimes
in England and the colonies, including murder, arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping
and several other offenses.66  In fact, before the 1790s, the death penalty was
mandatory for specified crimes; it was not until the nineteenth century that
states began to whittle away at mandatory death sentences by creating degrees
of murder and jury discretion.67  Although the number of executions peaked in
1935 at 199 nationwide, the number began to decrease slowly, falling to half that
number by the 1960s.68  The Supreme Court’s handling of capital punishment
cases in the 1960s likewise reflected deep ambivalence among the justices, par-
ticularly marked by their vacillation on the question whether a separate sen-
tencing hearing was required.69  Because of the dramatic changes in the attitude
of society and of the Court, it is noteworthy to identify the basis of the changes
and its relevance to feminism.
In 1972, the Supreme Court took its most dramatic and decisive step in ad-
dressing the death penalty.  The Court decided to hear four cases in which the
justices would address the question whether the death penalty was a violation of
the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.70
Of the capital cases it eventually heard, two involved not murder, but rape, and
one involved an accidental killing.  The case of the accidental killing was Fur-
man v. Georgia, in which the defendant, William Furman, suffering from psy-
66. TUSHNET, supra note 50, at 19-20.  For an overview of the development of capital punishment
in the United States, see GLENN PIERCE AND JOHN F. MCDEVITT, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 (1984) and VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION
TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1787-1975, xi-xiii (Philip English Mackey ed., 1976).
67. TUSHNET, supra note 50, at 22.
68. Id.
69. See BOB WOODWARD AND SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 242-47 (1979) (noting the
Court’s secret vote to strike down the Arkansas death penalty in Maxwell v. Bishop and the Court’s
subsequent decision in McGautha v. California to uphold current capital procedure without a bifur-
cated trial); see also TUSHNET, supra note 50, at 37-40.
70. The four cases to be heard were Aikens v. California, 403 U.S. 952 (1971), Furman v. Georgia,
403 U.S. 952 (1971), Branch v. Texas, 403 U.S. 952 (1971), and Jackson v. Georgia, 403 U.S. 952 (1971).
See John Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise
and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 172 (1986); see also WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 70, at 242.  About the same time that the Court decided to hear oral argu-
ments, the California Supreme Court found the death penalty unconstitutional under the state constitu-
tion, and thus Aikens no longer faced the death penalty.  Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed
his case.  See People v. Aikens, 406 U.S. 813 (1972); TUSHNET,  supra note 50, at 47.
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chotic episodes, broke into William Micke’s house late at night.71  When Micke
came downstairs to investigate, Furman fled the scene, tripped over an electri-
cal cord, and accidentally fired the gun he was carrying through the closed door
of the house.  The shot killed Micke.72
The Court was terribly divided over the imposition of capital sentencing and
ultimately voted 5-4 in Furman against the death penalty.  The Furman decision
was announced on the last day of the term, and each of the justices wrote his
own opinion.  The result totaled 50,000 words and 243 pages—the longest deci-
sion in the Court’s history.73  The bases for the opinion were varied.  Justice
Thurgood Marshall and Justice William Brennan wrote the most unequivocal
condemnations of capital punishment.  Justice Brennan found that capital pun-
ishment failed to pass constitutional muster based on four principles that he be-
lieved were essential to determine the constitutionality of punishment: The
punishment must comport with human dignity; it must not be arbitrary; it must
not be unacceptable to contemporary society; and finally, it must not by its se-
verity be degrading to human dignity. 74
Justice Marshall painted a broader condemnation of the punishment, argu-
ing that “retaliation, vengeance, and retribution” were not acceptable “aspira-
tions for . . . a free society.”75  He cited the discriminatory impact of the death
penalty on the poor, the ignorant, and the underprivileged, and argued that our
standards of decency had evolved to the point where capital punishment could
not be upheld.76  Justice Marshall also specifically noted the unequal treatment
of men and women in the face of capital punishment, but argued that “so long
as the capital sanction is used only against . . . easily forgotten members of soci-
ety, legislators are content to maintain the status quo.”77
The separate concurring opinions of Justices William Douglas, Potter Stew-
art, and Byron White used far different rationales for striking down capital
punishment under these circumstances.  These three justices appeared to be
more swayed by the arbitrary nature of the death penalty, rather than conclud-
ing that the punishment per se violated the Eighth Amendment.  Justice Stew-
art noted that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the in-
fliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”78  Justice White echoed
that the infrequent imposition of the death penalty and the lack of a meaningful
basis for distinguishing those cases in which the penalty was imposed created
flaws in the discretionary sentencing schemes.79  Justice Douglas specifically re-
71. 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969).
72. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295 (1972).
73. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 69, at 260.
74. Furman, 408 U.S. at 269-82.
75. Id. at 343 (Marshall, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also id. at 249-50 (Douglas, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 366 (Marshall, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 311-13 (White, J., concurring).
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frained from deciding whether imposition of the death penalty at all would be
constitutional.  Rather, he limited his concurrence to the idea that the discre-
tionary statutes were unconstitutional because they were full of discrimination
inconsistent with the idea of equal protection of the laws.80
A. The Failure of Furman to Get to the Heart of the Debate
Despite the recognition by the Supreme Court of the disparate impact of the
death penalty on different members of society, the problem with the Furman
decision, from a feminist point of view, is that it left too much leeway for our
patriarchal society to fill in the gaps.  Although Justices Douglas and Marshall
focused on discrimination in death sentencing, the grant of certiorari was lim-
ited to the question whether the imposition and implementation of the death
penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment, not the broader implications
of discrimination and its impetus.81  Likewise, although Justice Douglas believed
that the fatal flaw in capital sentencing was granting unfettered discretion to
judges and to the jury because it allowed them to act on their prejudices, he did
not question whether the system itself might be biased against those already
marginalized. 82  Accordingly, subsequent case law focused not on ending dis-
crimination, but on limiting the “unbridled discretion” of the jury.  If states
could add a level of predictability to the calculation and limit the discretion of
the jury in some way, the penalty could pass muster.83
The second problem with Furman was that the language of the decision
failed to press the sentencing process beyond its normative limits.  Justice
Brennan’s concurrence, arguably one of the more far-reaching opinions, noted
that the punishment must “not be unacceptable to contemporary society” to
“make certain that the judicial determination is objective as possible,”84 but
failed to address the question of who speaks for contemporary society in deter-
mining what is or is not acceptable.  His opinion failed in particular to note that
contemporary society in many parts of the country still sanctioned racial segre-
gation.  Justice Brennan never questioned why contemporary society continued
to punish poor men of color much more harshly than other members of its soci-
ety.
The majority opinions, while important for their principled stance against
the problems in capital sentencing, did not transcend classical “male” reasoning.
Feminist practical reasoning, by contrast, challenges the legitimacy of the norms
of those who claim to speak, through rules, for the community.  This reasoning
is premised on the belief that there is not one, “but many overlapping commu-
80. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
81. Poulos, supra note 70, at 172.
82. Id. at 173.
83. In light of this point, it is particularly interesting to note that the reaction of the states was to
enact mandatory capital sentencing laws that eliminated all jury discretion.  See infra Part IV.B.
84. Furman, 408 U.S. at 277.
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nities to which one might look for ‘reason.’”85  The Court did not consider who
purported to speak for the community.  Nor did any of the Justices really ques-
tion who set the standard of objectivity.  If so, they may have realized that they
had essentially reiterated traditional male thinking that fell short of recognizing
the perspective of the very people most affected by its decision.
Likewise, the Justices applied “formal rules of equality and other principles
of justice,” but did not look beyond the immediate facts of each case.  The Jus-
tices attempted to create universal rules that would address the problem with-
out realizing that abstract, universal reasoning could never address the layers of
prejudice and discrimination in the system.  To achieve a more feminist system
(admittedly, a goal they were not trying to reach), the Justices would have had
to acknowledge the limits of the current trial system in which the defendant’s
rights were juxtaposed against the government’s goals within the context of a
primarily white, male, middle-class society.
The tension between the opinions of the Justices centered on which stan-
dards should serve as the appropriate measure of the sentence’s constitutional-
ity.  While the Justices writing the majority opinions attempted to transcend
traditional black-letter law to incorporate the impact of fundamental injustice,
the application of the laws, in the end, limited true contextual thinking.  With-
out questioning the premise, the result is to disallow the language of emotion
and to divorce human experience from the sentence that is imposed.86  This
shortcoming is seen more starkly in the reasoning of Justice Harry Blackmun’s
dissent in Furman.  As Justice Blackmun noted, despite his “distaste, antipathy,
and, indeed, abhorrence” for the death penalty, the Court’s sole task was:
to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation that has been enacted and that is chal-
lenged. . . . We should not allow our personal preferences as to the wisdom of legisla-
tion and congressional action, or our distaste for such action, to guide our judicial de-
cisions in cases such as these.87
Judith Baer argues that the difficulty with statements such as Justice Black-
mun’s is that emotion and personal preference already exist in the system.88  Not
only are these emotions cloaked in judges’ robes, but the emotions of the vic-
tim, offender, and community members cannot be vacuumed out of the equa-
tion.  At the same time, there is a sanctioned appeal to juror discretion and the
imposition of their moral standards.  To pretend that the system is truly neutral
and not tainted by emotion is dishonest and simply a means of legitimizing the
system and rationalizing the consequences.
It is also important to consider how perpetuating this punishment, and this
way of thinking, further solidifies patriarchal bias in our criminal justice system.
85. Bartlett, supra note 10, at 855.
86. See Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 244, 244 (Patricia
Smith ed., 1993).
87. Furman, 408 U.S. at 405, 411.
88. Judith Baer, How is Law Male?  A Feminist Perspective on Constitutional Interpretation, in THE
DIFFERENCE DEBATE: FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 147, 155 (Leslie Friedman Goldstein ed., 1992).
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By killing mostly poor men without adequate representation,89 we as a society
are showing a callous disregard for the plight of marginalized people.  We ref-
use to empathize with the offenders, refuse to consider the context in which
their crimes were committed, and, more importantly, refuse to acknowledge our
society’s role in contributing to violent crime.  By imposing shallow means of
redress to victims of violence, we are invalidating a series of emotions and a way
of thinking that has been characterized as female.  Unless we address the femi-
nist implications of the death penalty, we are perpetuating a system of white,
male, middle-class bias with the most extreme results for all marginalized
groups.
B. After Furman: Cementing the Biases of the Majority in Death Penalty Case
Law
The Court’s failure to develop a more comprehensive and universal re-
sponse to the defects in capital punishment policy resulted in the death pen-
alty’s revival only a few short years later.  The Court relied primarily on two
factors in rationalizing societal return to capital sentencing: the role of the state
legislatures as representatives of community sentiment and limited sentencing
roles of juries.  The Court concluded that these factors represented “objective
indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.”90
As the Court noted in Gregg v. Georgia, at least thirty-five states reenacted
the death penalty in the years between Furman and Gregg. 91  The Court used
this phenomenon as evidence that many communities did support capital pun-
ishment.  It concluded that punishment selected by a democratically elected
legislature against a constitutional measure would be presumed valid.92  Yet the
Court never looked closely at the people serving in the state legislatures.  The
Court never questioned whether these individuals spoke on behalf of all com-
munities, or only the communities that had been represented, to the detriment
of others, throughout the history of the United States.
Second, the Court looked to the sentencing decisions of juries as a means to
revive capital punishment.  In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court specifically con-
sidered the role played by jurors and noted that it had been carefully circum-
scribed by “clear and objective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory
application.”93  The Court did not consider that these standards themselves may
89. See Stephen Bright, Essay, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1842 (1994) (noting that capital trials are “more like a
random flip of the coin than a delicate balancing of the scale” because of ill-trained, unprepared, and
grossly underpaid defense lawyers); Samuel R. Cross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis
of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984);
Ruth E. Friedman, Statistics and Death: The Conspicuous Rose of Race Bias in the Administration of the
Death Penalty, 11 LA RAZA L.J. 75, 75-76 (1999) (“[W]hile blacks constitute under 13% of the Ameri-
can population, they make up 42% of the over 3,500 inmates on the states’ death rows.”).
90. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987).
91. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976).
92. Id. at 175.
93. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 303.
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not be objective, but may instead reflect bias inherent in the system.  Similarly,
the Court did not ask why this “non-discriminatory” application was producing
skewed and de facto discriminatory results.
Likewise, the Court in McCleskey glorified the jury because of its “diffused
impartiality” in considering the facts of the case.  The Court set out a laundry
list of precautions it had taken to address discrimination in the system, but then
essentially concluded that any remaining bias would have to be permitted.94  The
Court found that the jury sentence reflected the “conscience of the community
as applied to the circumstances of a particular offender and offense.”95  The
Court did not honestly address the limits already in place on capital juries—
specifically that only those who would vote to impose the death penalty could
sit on a capital jury in the first place.  Already, the population had been reduced
to a subset that supported and sanctioned the current rule of law.
Again, we have to ask who is determining these objective criteria that dem-
onstrate a community consensus in support of the death penalty.  The Court’s
reluctance or inability to question the hypothetical or to think outside of the ab-
stract reasoning box exposes a bias that permeates its reasoning.  Ultimately,
the result of Court decisions after Furman has not been to purge the system of
arbitrary and capricious state killings, but rather to cement the biases of the
majority into death penalty case law.
V
EVIDENCE OF BIAS
Parts V and VI of this note address the wisdom of the procedures imposing
the death penalty, assuming that the death penalty is constitutional.  Part V
documents how the capital punishment law remains biased and continues to dif-
ferentiate based on gender.  Part VI exposes how victim impact statements,
while an attempt to give context to crime, fail to achieve true equal representa-
tion.
A. Discrepancies in Protecting the Public and Private Spheres
The issue of patriarchal bias is seen perhaps most starkly in the way courts
address homicide cases involving domestic partners and those involving more
public “stranger” crimes.  Feminist literature has long recognized separate
sphere ideology in which a public, male sphere is defined in contrast to a pri-
vate, female sphere.96  The male sphere includes that which is concerned with
arenas such as government, politics, and business—areas from which women
have traditionally been excluded, and which are regulated by the law.  In con-
trast, the law largely has ignored the private sphere—one defined by the home
and the family—particularly choosing to turn a blind eye to domestic violence
94. Id. at 310 n.30.
95. Id. at 310.
96. BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 14, at 2.
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perpetrated in the home by men.  This bias inherent in our system is reflected
today in those sitting on death row.
Statistics reveal the bias in the way that the law addresses homicide in the
public and private spheres.  The majority of those inmates on death row to-
day—at least 75%—are those who have killed someone in the course of another
serious felony.97  According to Elizabeth Rapaport, only about 18% of the total
number of homicides involve predatory killings of strangers, but this category
accounts for the greatest number of inmates on death row.98  Although 28% of
the total number of annual homicides involve the death of intimates or close
relatives, only 18% of those currently on death row are there for such a crime.99
In six states studied by Rapaport, only 12% of the men sentenced to die had
killed intimates, while almost 50% of death-sentenced women were domestic
killers.100  Additionally, the men and women sent to death row are there for dif-
ferent kinds of domestic crimes.  Nearly one-half of the men killed because a
woman left the relationship; over two-thirds of the women killed for pecuniary
gain—a factor that arguably makes the crime more public.101
Even consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors reveals a bias that
disproportionately protects people and property from stranger violence.  While
killing a public official or killing in the course of a predatory felony constitute
aggravating factors in capital cases, violence in the home is conspicuously ab-
sent from the list.102  In those domestic violence cases that do lead to capital sen-
tences, the most common aggravators are extreme brutality, commission during
another felony, and multiple murders.103
The legal response to domestic killings versus public killings reveals a set of
male-privileged priorities codified in the law.  The law has created a variety of
defenses that provide a way out for those men who murder their intimate part-
ners—for example, recognizing the “heat of passion” defense as a means of
mitigating culpability.104  This bias is revealed most strikingly in Godfrey v.
Georgia,105 one of the better-known domestic violence homicides.  In this case,
the petitioner’s wife decided to leave the petitioner and move in with her
mother to escape what was an undisputedly abusive relationship.106  She brought
aggravated assault charges against her husband and filed for divorce.  Her hus-
band pursued her and ultimately found her at her mother’s house, where he
97. Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital Domestic
Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1510 (1996).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1517.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1511-13.
103. Id. at 1515 tbl. 1.
104. See, e.g., State v. Ott, 686 P.2d 1001 (Or. 1984); Belton v. Commonwealth, 104 S.E.2d 1 (Va.
1958).
105. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
106. Id. at 424.
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killed both her and her mother with a shotgun.107  The issue that marks this case
is the question whether the murder was “unambiguously ‘outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman’” so as to warrant the death penalty.108  The court
found that it was not.  Additionally, “Justice Stewart appears to go further, sug-
gesting that domestic murder cases are inherently run-of-the-mill” when com-
pared to capital murders, arguing that because his victims were killed instanta-
neously and were “members of his family who were causing him extreme
emotional trauma,” his crime was no more depraved than any other murder.109
This sort of rationale for discounting domestic murders is not uncommon.  At
least three states—North Carolina, Illinois, and Florida—have a judicially-
created exemption from capital punishment for domestic separation murder-
ers.110
From a feminist perspective, the legislative and judicial responses to domes-
tic violence homicides reveal an intrinsic bias within the system.  It cannot be
ignored that married women traditionally were considered the property of their
husbands and that, in general, the legal system would not interfere with a man’s
treatment of his spouse.  If a man went too far and actually killed his wife, the
“law frowned on it, but this was a minor offense when compared with that of a
woman killing her husband, a treasonous act for which the woman would be
burnt alive.”111  As noted in the 19th century North Carolina Supreme Court
case State v. Rhodes,112  “[w]e will not inflict upon society the greater evil of
raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling
violence.”113  While the law no longer explicitly sanctions domestic violence, the
disparate treatment between wife- and-husband killings persists today.  In addi-
tion to different capital penalties, men who kill their partners spend an average
of two to six years in prison.  Women convicted of killing their partners spend
an average of fifteen years behind bars.114
These statistics reveal that, within the legal system, it has become acceptable
to limit the intrusion of the capital law into the family.  According to dominance
theory, the result is to filter the perspective of women out of the legal parame-
ters: It silences the experiences of women out of the equation.  Cloaking this
treatment of women in the “Rule of Law” imposed by “objective” judges le-
gitimizes female powerlessness and sanctions the way that women are treated.
This public/private dichotomy exposes gender bias inherent in the system.
This bias also emerges in the way that women offenders are treated within the
107. Id. at 425.
108. Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 72 (quoting Godfrey,
446 U.S. at 432).
109. Rapaport, supra note 97, at 1521 (quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. 433).
110. Id. at 1522-30.
111. Maryanne E. Kampmann, The Legal Victimization of Battered Women, 15 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 101, 102 (1993).
112. 61 N.C. 453 (1868).
113. Id. at 459.
114. Kampmann, supra note 111, at 101.
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capital system.  Rapaport notes that “there are deep cultural inhibitions against
the deliberate killing of women, even women who have been convicted of hei-
nous murders, which war with the criminal law norm of equality of treatment of
cases and the strictures of the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection
clause.”115  It is true that women rarely commit the kinds of crimes that lead to
capital sentences, yet again we must consider which crimes provoke these sen-
tences.  For example, women commit only six percent of the felony murders,
but they kill spouses and children almost as often as men do.116  Rapaport con-
cludes that, “while capital statutes offer their special protection to representa-
tives of the state and to the interaction of non-intimates, the third of the three
spheres into which society can be divided, family life, is notably absent from the
statute’s universe of concerns.”117  The result is a system that “is chivalrous to
women as perpetrators, since such a high percentage of the homicides women
commit are domestic; but it is not chivalrous to women as victims, since the
blameworthiness of domestic homicide is discounted relative to stranger kill-
ings.”118
From a different-voice point of view, the fact that the law does so little to
protect the “female” sphere, but punishes most harshly the public “male”
sphere, reveals the male orientation of the system—both in terms of whom it
chooses to punish and whom it chooses to protect.  It is particularly revealing if
we consider that many of these laws were written when very few women were
even integrated into the public sphere.  Yet, this dichotomy persists today.  In
the current criminal justice system, we are more likely to punish the taking of
property in the form of robbery-murder than to punish the killing of a spouse or
child in anger.119  It is notable to consider the contrast in criminal law that pro-
tects the sanctity of the home from strangers yet does little to protect the sanc-
tity of the home from co-occupants.  For example, some self-defense statutes do
not require a man to retreat before using deadly force if he is attacked by a
stranger within his home.120  Likewise, some states regard an attack within the
home by a stranger as an aggravating factor in death penalty cases.121  At the
same time, an attack by an intimate within the home will usually not be consid-
ered a capital crime without a showing of deliberateness, premeditation, or an
intent to kill on the part of the offender.122
115. Elizabeth Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and the Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 501, 503 (1990).
116. Id. at 509-10.
117. Id. at 558.
118. Id. at 559.
119. See id. at 560.
120. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 8A; Stuart P. Green, Castles and Carjackers: Proportion-
ality and the Use of Deadly Force in Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (de-
scribing the history of the castle doctrine).
121. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(15)(Michie Supp. 1997) (aggravating factors include
murders committed by intentionally discharging a firearm into an inhabited dwelling).
122. Rapaport, supra note 115, at 564-65.
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Surely the reason our law has developed as it has in this regard is that men, whose per-
spectives have shaped the law, have had far less reason to fear their intimates than
have women and children, and at the same time, have had an investment in supporting
the privileged separateness of the domestic sphere under male authority.123
The answer to this dilemma is not to impose capital punishment on domestic
violence killers to even the score.  As we have seen, to do so would be to play
into the hands of those who perpetuate the system and to accept as valid their
punishments.  The argument instead is one against imposing capital punishment
at all.  It advocates a different and more equitable system altogether—a system
that values the sanctity of the home on all levels.
B. Reflections of Bias in Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions
1. Mitigating and Aggravating Factors.  We do not have to consider cases
that directly involve women to document the patriarchal bias pervasive in death
penalty jurisprudence.  One consequence of resorting to “objective” standards
is seen in the debate over who is eligible for death.  The Supreme Court re-
jected standards that granted judges and juries unfettered discretion in sen-
tencing someone to death and likewise struck down laws that prevented juries
from exercising any discretion.  The Court instead sanctioned the use of aggra-
vating and mitigating factors that juries could weigh in determining whether
capital punishment was appropriate.124  The Court’s reasoning was ostensibly to
provide guidance to the juries and to establish some sort of uniform standard
that would eliminate the arbitrary nature of the imposition of capital punish-
ment.125  However, as Bartlett notes, “facts determine which rules are appropri-
ate and rules determine which facts are relevant.”126  The rules laid down by the
Court and the state legislatures to guide who is sentenced to die are one way in
which the state imposes male values codified and validated in a formula that is
applied by all jurors.  The result is to sanction one perspective that, when
cloaked with the authority of the government, appears to lose its subjectivity.
Renaming the process as “objective” does not make it so.
What results from imposing this set of “objective” mitigating and aggravat-
ing factors is a denial of true discretion and moral responsibility to jurors.  It
allows prosecutors to make appeals for death sentences in a “dispassionate,
lawyerly, legalistic form” in which jurors are urged to apply a fact-finding for-
mula.127  Jurors are often led to believe that, if they add the aggravating factors
and subtract the mitigating factors, they will arrive at a magic solution that
strips them of any moral responsibility for their decision.  Robert Weisberg
found that the defense narrative is one that is difficult to convey and that the
123. Id. at 565.
124. See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
125. See id.
126. Bartlett, supra note 13, at 836.
127. Henderson, supra note 86, at 248.
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“legalistic formula can provide sanctuary from moral anxiety.”128  The result is to
take the decision out of the context of the community and to boil it down to an
abstract and universal principle.  Ultimately, the jurors are repeating and en-
gaging in a system of male legal reasoning and divorcing themselves from the
part they play in the process.
The irony in revealing bias in this process is that the Supreme Court explic-
itly recognized the need for jurors to consider the individualized circumstances
of the defendant’s life.  Specifically, in Lockett v. Ohio,129 the Court reiterated its
holding that the “sentencing process must permit consideration of the ‘charac-
ter and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the
penalty of death.”130  Yet, subsequent Supreme Court decisions limited the ex-
tent to which jurors or the state courts truly had to engage in this process.131
Weisberg criticizes the Court’s interpretation of this individual consideration,
arguing that
the states must have some sort of penalty trial law on their books to fill the embar-
rassing gap created by Furman.  The law must somehow identify a class of death-
eligible murderers smaller than the class of all murderers, must give some sentencer
some discretion about choosing which of the eligibles to execute, and must grant de-
fendants a fairly broad opportunity to make a case for mitigation.  Beyond that, the
rule may be of any kind, and the Court will not monitor its enforcement.132
2. Disregard for Racial Bias.  Other recent death penalty decisions from the
Supreme Court reveal a steadfast adherence to “objective” tests and rational
results that appear to exclude the viewpoint of marginalized people.  For exam-
ple, in McCleskey v. Kemp,133 the defendant’s attorneys showed the court over-
whelming statistical evidence that defendants charged with killing white persons
were more likely to be sentenced to die than those who killed black persons.134
Those cases in which a black defendant killed a white victim were most likely to
result in a death sentence.135  Interestingly enough, the Eleventh Circuit in an en
banc opinion found that such discriminatory treatment passed constitutional
muster.  “It would not make sense for the system to require the exercise of dis-
cretion in order to be facially constitutional, and at the same time hold a system
unconstitutional in application where that discretion achieved different results
for what appear to be exact duplicates . . . .”136 The Eleventh Circuit was more
128. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 379-95 (1983).
129. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
130. Id. at 601 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (emphasis added)).
131. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (holding that, despite the fact that one of the
three aggravating factors was found later to be unconstitutional, all of the evidence would have come in
anyway, so the error was harmless); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (finding that the judge’s dis-
cretion was “constitutionally adequate” despite the fact that it may have violated state law).
132. Weisberg, supra note 128, at 358.
133. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
134. Id. at 286.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 289-90 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 898-99 (1985)).
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up-front in naming the bias prevalent in the system and found that it still fit the
Furman test: “In pre-Furman days, there was no rhyme or reason as to who got
the death penalty and who did not.  But now, in the vast majority of cases, the
reasons for a difference are well documented.”137
The Supreme Court, while assuming the statistical validity of the study, dis-
counted the conclusion that race played into any sentencing decisions in Geor-
gia.  The Court would only acknowledge that there was a risk that race entered
into some of the capital sentencing decisions.138  This risk was insufficient to risk
upsetting the entire system.  Essentially, the Court practiced typical “male” rea-
soning as defined by  Gilligan—it adopted a distanced stance from the over-
arching issue and did not look beyond the immediate facts to question the re-
sults in McCleskey’s, or any other defendant’s, case.
Perhaps most revealing of its patriarchal bias, the Court dismissed
McCleskey’s claim that discrimination “extend[ed] to every actor in the Georgia
capital sentencing process, from the prosecutor who sought the death penalty
and the jury that imposed the sentence, to the State itself that enacted the capi-
tal punishment statute and allows it to remain in effect despite its allegedly dis-
criminatory application.”139  Justice Lewis Powell seemed to scoff at the notion
that such widespread discrimination could exist—never questioning the possi-
bility that the whole system could be pervaded by a system of beliefs that privi-
leged its white sons at the expense of other people.  It is further revealing that
the Court justified its decision based on the fear that, if they accepted
McCleskey’s claim that racial bias had tainted the capital sentencing decision,
they might have to face similar claims in other penalties where a disproportion-
ate number of defendants were male or people of color.140  Fear that an entire




One way the state has attempted to equalize the system is to allow the pres-
entation of a victim impact statement.  The victim impact statement appears to
be consistent with many of the philosophies expounded by feminists—it allows
the victim or their family members, who are often marginalized in the criminal
justice system to give context and voice to the crime that occurred.  It incorpo-
rates narrative into a process that is generally full of expert testimony, cross ex-
amination, and fact-specific questions.  It calls for empathy and gives insight
into the impact of the crime in a way that extends beyond the immediate case at
trial.  In fact, feminist anti-rape groups were among the first to organize and ad-
137. Id.
138. Id. at 292 n.7.
139. Id. at 292.
140. Id. at 315.
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vocate on behalf of victims in the 1970s.141  On a national level, the efforts of
Candy Lightner, founder of Mothers Against Drunk Driving, “marked the be-
ginning of successful political and social recognition of victims.”142
The problem with the use of such statements is that they endorse “male”
emotions such as anger and vengeance and leave little room for context or for
resolutions outside the traditional legal system.  As Bartlett notes, “the ques-
tions, as always, are: who gets to tell the story and what agenda will the telling
serve.”143  In the case of victim impact stories, it is often the prosecutor who tells
the story, already intent on securing a death sentence, to play on the jury’s sym-
pathy and to dehumanize the defendant further.  The stories are used as a
means to trump those rights.  In fact, those who support the use of victim im-
pact statements “do not [always] argue for the punishment of the guilty as a
duty owed to the individual victim” but “they argue in terms of the duty and
right of the state and community to punish.”144
While advocates of victim impact statements may argue that they humanize
the victim and her family,  the statements often reduce the victim to the crime
alone.  As Susan Bandes notes, the victim impact statement offers little room
for complex and politically liberal narratives.145  The statements draw on “stock”
victim imagery to feed the imagination of the jury.  Instead of providing victims
with counseling, support, and concern, the state manipulates the victim’s pain
into fodder to serve its own agenda.146  Likewise, “the unreflective translation of
the anger of victims into a desire for retaliatory retribution” might be inaccu-
rate, constituting moral error.147
From a feminist perspective, victim impact statements are problematic on
many levels.  In terms of dominance feminist philosophy, the problem is inher-
ent in the fact that the existing criminal justice system, created by those in
power, was not created to empower those who have been silenced.  Instead,
twisting the experiences of the “other” into conformity with the experiences of
those in the majority does not necessarily result in true liberation.  Instead, it is
an attempt to equalize women’s roles by giving them access to male institutions,
without addressing the fact that these standards may not be appropriate for all
people.  For example, the system emphasizes anger, punishment, and revenge.
Asking victims to adopt these emotions may not be entirely consistent with
their own experience and may be distorting and privileging one set of emotions
to the detriment of other emotions.  The result is the continued silencing of the
experiences that do not fit neatly into this paradigm.
141. See Lynne Henderson, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victim’s Rights Amendment, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 579, 581 (1998).
142. Id.
143. Katharine Bartlett, Story Telling, 1987 DUKE L.J. 760, 765 (1987).
144. Henderson, supra note 141, at 594.
145. Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 405
(1996).
146. See Henderson, supra note 86, at 276.
147. Id.
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Additionally, sanctifying the role of victim in this process may serve to “re-
victimize” victims.  Particularly in cases involving women, it risks cementing the
woman’s place on a pedestal where she needs the protection and guidance of
the state.  Instead of empowering victims, the system can impose upon a woman
a set of expectations on how she should react and what she should feel.  As
Carol Smart has noted, criminal justice reforms can “make women embrace
their victim status more warmly.”148  The current use of the victim impact state-
ments “illustrates the emptiness of the concepts of empathy and narrative when
they are constrained by extrinsic normative, political, or moral principles.”149
From a different-voice perspective, the victim impact statement also falls
short.  While the addition of these statements appears to fit more closely into
this feminist theory, in reality, it distorts the philosophy—crediting one voice
while silencing the other.  Arguably, the defendant can present his own narra-
tive in the form of mitigating evidence, but the procedure itself is skewed in that
the result is all or nothing.  Because of the design of the American trial process,
the victim is pitted against the offender.  If the offender is not sentenced with
the most harsh penalty, the victim somehow loses.  Tying the victim’s “win” to
the state’s performance is already problematic, particularly because the state’s
role effectively ends once a conviction is secured.  Once the assailant is impris-
oned or executed, little is done to address the anger and grief experienced by
the victim.
Complicating the issue is the addition of “undesirable” victims: victims that
are poor, criminal, unattractive, those who do not exhibit the “appropriate”
emotional response, or who are, in some way, alien to the notion of one who
deserves the protection of the state.  As we have seen, it has not always been in
the state’s interest to represent fully and accurately the views of those that are
marginalized by the system.  It is unclear whether the voices of these victims
will be heard as well.  If the story will not help to secure a conviction or par-
ticular punishment, and if the victim does not fit into the box created by the
state, the prosecution may shy away from using such evidence at trial or the jury
may discount the victim’s story.  The result is to extrinsically value certain vic-




Given the failings of the current system to embrace a more universal and
gender-equitable structure, it is evident that a massive overhaul of the criminal
justice system is in order—particularly with respect to capital cases.  Despite the
Supreme Court’s insistence that judges and juries consider the individual merits
148. Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671, 711
(1999) (quoting Carol Smart).
149. Bandes, supra note 145, at 393.
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of each capital case, these merits are considered according to very carefully de-
lineated boundaries.  Absent from consideration are the context of the crime
committed and a true understanding of the humanity of the defendant or the
victim.  Pervasive in the system is an emphasis on retribution and revenge based
on an all-or-nothing outcome.  Those defendants who lose are silenced entirely
out of the equation, and the system learns nothing from their experience.  The
result is to emphasize traditionally masculine conceptions of the world that ex-
clude the voices of those who do not already fit into this perspective.
To create a truly equitable system would require a massive overhaul not
only of the current law, but also of the political and social conceptions of those
who make, execute, and encounter the law.  Simply accommodating women’s
voices by inserting them into a male system is insufficient and cannot address
the deep-seated inequities in the system.  For example, acknowledging the im-
pact of crime on the victim is a worthy enterprise, but using the statements in
the context of sentencing distorts its purpose.  Rather, we should consider how
the state could help victims voice their experiences and recover from the crime,
perhaps through state-sponsored counseling or a more meaningful interaction
between the prosecutor and the victim’s family.  Likewise, the courts should re-
consider the restriction of opponents of capital punishment on sentencing juries.
We should entrust such grave matters as imposing a death sentence to juries
that more accurately reflect the diverse voices in our society.
Additionally, it is important for feminist organizations to realize the connec-
tion between the death penalty and their own objectives.  Once the punishment
is seen as affecting more than just the few thousand who sit on death row, we
can begin a more productive conversation.  Ultimately, we can use the abolition
of the death penalty as a means to re-invent the criminal justice system, to call
into question the tenets upon which our criminal law is based, and to reinvigor-
ate the system with a more universal perspective.
From a practical point of view, achieving true gender equity is nearly over-
whelming.  The task is not impossible, however.  For example, feminist theory
has already led to new ways of using the law, for example, leading to the crea-
tion of rape-shield laws, recognizing marital rape, and identifying sexual har-
assment.  Such a task is equally important here in the context of capital punish-
ment.  Before that process can begin, however, we must move away from
traditional methods of considering reform.  It is important for legislators to seek
broader input on legislation and for courts to reflect more thoroughly upon
whose voices they are representing.  Imposing death as punishment when we, as
a society, are so far from the heart of the debate is simply too great a price to
pay.
